

Information Policies and Higher Education Choices Experimental Evidence from Colombia

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Information Policies for Higher Education

1. Governments are investing in providing online information:

- ▶ Labor Observatories
- ▶ Student loan calculators

Information Policies for Higher Education

1. Governments are investing in providing online information:
 - ▶ Labor Observatories
 - ▶ Student loan calculators
2. Cost-effective for secondary school enrollment:
 - ▶ Jensen, 2010, Nguyen, 2008



Information Policies for Higher Education

1. Less promising results in higher education:

- ▶ Earning Premiums:
 - ▶ Pekkala-Kerr et al., 2015, Wiswall and Zafar, 2015, Fryer Jr., 2016, Rao, 2016.
- ▶ Costs and funding:
 - ▶ Bettinger et al., 2012, Booij et al., 2012, Hoxby and Turner, 2013, Loyalka et al., 2013, Dinkelman and Martínez, 2014.
- ▶ Both:
 - ▶ Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013, Hastings et al., 2015, Avitabile and De Hoyos Navarro, 2015, Busso et al., 2016, McGuigan et al., 2016.

This paper

- ▶ RCT in public schools of Bogotá providing information on **funding programs** and **earning premiums** by degree-college:
 1. How informed are students?
 2. Do simple information treatments reduce misinformation and affect higher education choices?
- ▶ Randomly selected 120 schools, half of which receive a 35-minute talk.
- ▶ Surveys and administrative records to analyze student beliefs and choices.

Main Results

1. Students are generally misinformed, specially regarding higher education wage premiums.
2. They learn about funding programs from the talk but not about labor observatory or earning beliefs.
3. The intervention has no average effect on exit exam scores or average enrollment.
4. Additional information has a small effect on intensive margin (More selective colleges).

Policy implications

1. Providing information is not enough to raise college enrollment.
 - ▶ As opposed to student-loans and merit-based scholarships which have proven to be effective in increasing enrollment and test scores of low-income students ((Melguizo et al., 2016, Londoño et al., 2017, Laajaj et al., 2017)
2. Even though less targeted or personalized than Hastings et al. (2015) or Busso et al. (2016), our intervention does affect intensive margin choices.

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Higher Education in Colombia


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Higher education premiums by college and degree



1 monthly MW \approx US\$288

Costs of higher education

- ▶ **Higher education is not free:**
 - ▶ Costs range from \$30 per semester (0.1 MWs) in public institutions (progressive tuition fees) to \$6,000 (20.7 MWs) at the most expensive private university.
- ▶ Funding programs exist, but depend on academic performance and a co-debtor with **collateral**:
 - ▶ ICETEX (national) and FESBO (local) government funding agencies.
- ▶ Therefore, going to college is easier for individuals who:
 - ▶ gain admission into highly selective *public* institutions.
 - ▶ are not credit-constrained and/or meet the requirements to obtain funding.

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
Conclusions

RCT design and timeline

We target the universe of public schools in Bogotá and randomly select 120 schools from the 570 available:

[Targeting](#)

[Map](#)



Treatment: Informative session

Students in 115 schools surveyed. In 58 schools, students listened to a 35-minute talk given by young Colombian college graduates on:

1. Higher education premiums:

- ▶ Average premiums by education level. [Premiums 1](#)
- ▶ Earning premiums and probability of formal employment by college-degree (Labor Observatory website). [Premiums 2](#)

2. Funding programs:

- ▶ Emphasis on ICETEX and FESBO. We provide links for them to explore further.

3. Importance of exit exam test scores

Note: Students also received the information in print. [Printed version](#)

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Data and empirical strategy

► Surveys

- Baseline: 6,601 students in 115 schools.
- Follow up: 5,503 students in 115 schools.
- 16.6% attrition between surveys, mainly due to student absences.

► Administrative records

- SABER 11 test scores: 95.7% match to baseline.
- Enrollment data: 95.4% match to baseline.

► Sample is balanced and attrition unrelated to treatment status.

► Balance

► Attrition diagnostics

Empirical Strategy

1. Cross-section:

$$y_{is,t=1} = \alpha + \beta Treat_{s,t=0} + \gamma X_{is,t=0} + u_{is,t=1} \quad (1)$$

2. Diff-in-Diff with student fixed effects (data permitting):

$$y_{ist} = \alpha Post + \beta (Treat_s \times Post) + \lambda_i + u_{ist} \quad (2)$$

- ▶ Covariates: basic individual, family, and school characteristics.
- ▶ Standard errors clustered at the school-level.
- ▶ Multiple hypothesis testing adjusted p -values (Aker et al., 2012).

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
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Earning premium beliefs (at baseline)



- ▶ Almost 90% of students overestimate college premiums.
- ▶ Consistent with previous findings:
 - ▶ Gamboa and Rodríguez (2014), McGuigan et al. (2014), Pekkala-Kerr et al. (2015), Hastings et al. (2015)

Treatment effects on knowledge and beliefs

	Knowledge			Perceived earning errors	
	Labor Observatory	ICETEX	FESBO	Vocational	Academic
A. ANCOVA					
Treatment	0.008 (0.007)	0.049*** (0.016)	0.016 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.001 (0.029)
Adjusted p-value	0.761	0.009	0.608	1.000	1.000
Observations	5,080	5,365	5,112	5,121	5,169
B. Difference-in-differences					
Treatment × Post	-0.005 (0.010)	0.046** (0.018)	0.007 (0.014)	0.037 (0.038)	0.035 (0.035)
Adjusted p-value	0.978	0.051	0.986	0.844	0.832
Observations	10,556	10,861	10,591	10,599	10,656
Baseline mean	0.077	0.694	0.175	0.636	0.949

Source: Authors' calculations from survey data.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Treatment effects on test scores and enrollment

	Test scores			Higher education choices				
	Overall score	Math	Language	College enrollment	Academic degree	Private college	Top-10 college	STEM field
A. Full sample								
Treatment	-0.002 (0.038)	0.045 (0.042)	-0.004 (0.033)	0.004 (0.022)	0.008 (0.008)	0.013 (0.012)	0.005** (0.003)	0.005 (0.006)
Adjusted p-value	0.997	0.343	0.952	0.997	0.754	0.593	0.086	0.872
Observations	6,318	6,318	6,318	6,298	6,298	6,298	6,298	6,298
B. Balanced sample								
Treatment	0.019 (0.039)	0.065 (0.041)	0.011 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.010 (0.008)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006 (0.006)
Adjusted p-value	0.858	0.144	0.826	1.000	0.601	0.719	0.082	0.779
Observations	5,427	5,427	5,427	5,414	5,414	5,414	5,414	5,414
Baseline mean				0.438	0.096	0.150	0.011	0.052

Source: Authors' calculations from surveys matched to administrative data.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Similar test scores effects by quantiles:

Heterogeneous effects

	Knowledge			Perceived earning errors	
	Labor Observatory	ICETEX	FESBO	Vocational	Academic
A. Gender					
Female	-0.012 (0.013)	0.033 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.047 (0.053)	0.068 (0.046)
Male	0.002 (0.015)	0.060* (0.024)	0.021 (0.019)	0.025 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.042)
Female=Male	0.998	0.963	0.969	1.000	0.891
B. Family income					
Low (≤ 2 MW)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.051 (0.021)	0.004 (0.016)	0.020 (0.048)	0.032 (0.039)
Middle (> 2 MW)	-0.009 (0.016)	0.035 (0.024)	0.013 (0.025)	0.073 (0.047)	0.045 (0.051)
Low=Middle	1.000	0.997	1.000	0.996	1.000
C. Error direction					
Under or equal	-0.010 (0.040)	0.162** (0.051)	0.080 (0.048)	0.195 (0.100)	0.119 (0.090)
Over	-0.006 (0.011)	0.038 (0.019)	0.002 (0.015)	0.025 (0.037)	0.022 (0.035)
Under=Over	1.000	0.141	0.738	0.603	0.978

Heterogeneous effects

	Test scores			Higher education choices				
	Overall score	Math	Language	College enrollment	Academic degree	Private college	Top-10 college	STEM field
A. Gender								
Female	-0.030 (0.043)	0.029 (0.047)	-0.045 (0.041)	-0.014 (0.026)	0.007 (0.015)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006 (0.011)	0.001 (0.007)
Male	0.030 (0.048)	0.063 (0.050)	0.043 (0.041)	0.025 (0.024)	0.021 (0.014)	0.007 (0.004)	0.011 (0.013)	0.008 (0.010)
Female=Male	0.632	0.677	0.133	0.659	0.961	0.991	1.000	0.998
B. Family income								
Low (<2 MW)	-0.022 (0.042)	0.022 (0.043)	-0.017 (0.039)	0.006 (0.023)	0.024 (0.011)	0.004 (0.003)	0.013 (0.009)	0.005 (0.007)
Middle (>2 MW)	0.042 (0.049)	0.096 (0.055)	0.026 (0.046)	0.000 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.004 (0.013)
Low=Middle	0.541	0.221	0.591	1.000	0.492	0.974	0.986	1.000
C. Error direction								
Under or equal	0.004 (0.099)	0.081 (0.099)	0.033 (0.094)	0.056 (0.045)	0.027 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.030 (0.033)	0.032 (0.018)
Over	-0.008 (0.037)	0.043 (0.041)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.010 (0.013)	0.006 (0.003)	0.004 (0.009)	0.002 (0.007)
Under=Over	1.000	0.853	0.826	0.636	0.998	0.959	0.994	0.620

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1. Students seem to care more about costs than returns
 - ▶ Most overestimate higher education premiums.
 - ▶ They learn more about funding programs but do not update their earning beliefs.
2. No effect on test scores or enrollment:
 - ▶ Misinformation is a potential problem, but not the main one.
 - ▶ School loans and merit-based scholarship do increase enrollment.
3. Intensive margin effects:
 - ▶ Informed students are more likely to choose selective colleges.
 - ▶ Achieved similar results to Hastings et al. (2015) or Busso et al. (2016) with less targeted/personalized treatment.
 - ▶ *Simple* information campaigns have a potential for scaling-up.


Thank you

Targeting: Public high schools in Bogotá


	Private schools		Public schools	
	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)
<i>Panel A: Student characteristics</i>				
Parent completed college	0.580	(0.494)	0.156	(0.363)
Family income (>2 MWs)	0.726	(0.446)	0.297	(0.457)
<i>Panel B: Exit Exam</i>				
Standardized SABER 11 score (2010-2012)	0.874	(0.809)	0.117	(0.254)
<i>Panel C: Higher education choices</i>				
Enrolled	0.571	(0.495)	0.426	(0.495)
Public college	0.147	(0.354)	0.278	(0.448)
Private college	0.424	(0.494)	0.148	(0.355)
Top-10 college	0.160	(0.366)	0.011	(0.106)
Academic degree (4-year)	0.370	(0.483)	0.098	(0.298)
Vocational degree (2-year)	0.201	(0.400)	0.328	(0.469)
STEM degree	0.211	(0.408)	0.054	(0.227)
Total number of students	37,068		37,787	
Total number of schools	790		570	

Source: Authors' calculations from ICFES and SNIES administrative data.

Selected schools



Average college premiums (1)



College premiums (1)



Calculadora de salarios por profesión para graduados 2001-2011

*Calcule el salario promedio del programa e institución en la que piensa estudiar o estudió para darse una idea de cuál es el sueldo de estos profesionales.

Región: BOGOTA D.C.

Institución: UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA

Programa: GEOGRAFIA

Sexo:

Programa	Sexo	Ingreso	Graduados
GEOGRAFIA	HOMBRES	2,001,204	110
GEOGRAFIA	MUJERES	1,920,567	72

Fuente: Observatorio Laboral para la Educación

College premiums (2)



Calculadora de salarios por profesión para graduados 2001-2011

*Calcule el salario promedio del programa e institución en la que piensa estudiar o estudió para darse una idea de cuál es el sueldo de estos profesionales.

Región: BOGOTA D.C.

Institución: UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA

Programa: GEOLOGIA

Sexo:

Programa	Sexo	Ingreso	Graduados
GEOLOGIA	HOMBRES	5,693,092	292
GEOLOGIA	MUJERES	5,254,615	149
MAESTRIA EN CIENCIAS - GEOLOGIA	HOMBRES	6,602,101	33
MAESTRIA EN CIENCIAS - GEOLOGIA	MUJERES	7,083,250	7


Fuente: Observatorio Laboral para la Educación

Handout given to students

¡La educación superior paga!

La relación entre estudios e ingresos

La educación superior es un factor determinante de la situación económica y por tanto la calidad de vida de las familias. En el siguiente gráfico se presentan los salarios promedio por nivel educativo en Bogotá.



Como se puede observar, mayor educación se traduce en salarios más altos. En el caso de Bogotá el salario se pasa de los 467.000 a 274.000 por mes. El salario es más evidente para aquellos con un título de nivel terciario o universitario que obtienen un salario promedio de 1.462.000. Estas estadísticas presentan un mensaje claro: vale la pena estudiar.

¿Cómo puedo averiguar cuanto ganaría en la carrera que a mí me interesa?

Es probable que ya tengas una idea sobre lo que te interesa y la institución donde quieras realizar estos estudios. Si es así, ¿hay alguna manera de saber cuánto puedes esperar ganar en su situación específica?

Existen dos lugares donde puedes consultar el salario promedio de los graduados por institución y carrera. Están en:

1. Calculadora de salarios promedio para graduados: www.finanzasparaescolares.com.co

Esta página cuenta con una herramienta que te permite consultar el salario promedio por región, institución educativa y carrera. La calculadora muestra los salarios que obtuvieron su título entre 2001-2011.

¿Cómo funciona?

Accede al enlace e ingresa la Calculadora de Salario por profesión para Graduados

- Escoge la región donde quiere realizar la búsqueda (por ejemplo, Bogotá) y la institución donde quiere realizar sus estudios y el programa que pliega cursar

2. Observatorio laboral del Ministerio de Educación: observatoriolaboral.mineducacion.gov.co

Esta página también provee información sobre los salarios promedio de personas con título de educación superior para cada carrera y la posibilidad de consultar las perspectivas laborales del programa de estudio de su interés.

¿Cómo funciona?

- Accede al enlace y busca el botón rojo que dice "Sígueme" y crea tu cuenta en el sistema.
- Si quiere conocer el número de graduados por carrera, acceda a la pestaña que dice "Perfil nacional". Deberá elegir la carrera deseada y podrá consultar y obtener los datos de graduados por área de estudio.

Si deseas saber cuáles individuos en su área de interés tienen un empleo formal (contando a la seguridad social) y cuánto ganan en promedio vaya a "Vinculación laboral" y seleccione "Por Carrera". Allí tiene la opción de buscar por institución o por carrera.

Recuerde que estas páginas te permiten conocer el salario promedio de los profesionales graduados en su campo de estudio.

¿Qué necesito para entrar a la Universidad y la carrera que a mí me interesa?

Es probable que ya tengas una idea sobre lo que te interesa y la institución donde quieras realizar estos estudios. Si es así, ¿hay alguna manera de saber cuánto puedes esperar ganar en su situación específica?

1. Buenos resultados académicos: Uno de los criterios más importantes a la hora de bucear admisión a una universidad es tener buenos resultados académicos. Muchas instituciones utilizan el puntaje del examen de admisión como criterio para seleccionar a los universitarios que tienen su propio examen de admisión de acuerdo con esto aumenta las posibilidades de acceder a becas o financiación.

2. Financiación: Existen varias maneras de financiar la universidad. Una de las más comunes es que las personas prevean los alumnos de escasos recursos y buen desempeño académico. Las siguientes son algunas opciones a tener en cuenta:

• Becas provistas por cada institución por mérito académico y/o escasos recursos. Consulte las políticas de admisión que ya están son diferentes para cada institución.

• CETEX: www.cetex.edu.co
Ministerio de Educación de Bogotá (Banco de cupos, Fondo de Financiamiento de Educación Superior de Bogotá); www.cetex.edu.co/index.php/estudios-superior.html

Baseline balance (F-test p-value=0.239)

	Control		Treatment		Difference
	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	p-value
Student attributes					
Male	0.475	(0.499)	0.472	(0.499)	0.831
Age	17.639	(0.925)	17.663	(0.942)	0.504
Parent completed secondary	0.398	(0.489)	0.392	(0.488)	0.719
Parent completed higher education	0.176	(0.381)	0.155	(0.362)	0.270
Family income (<1 minimum wage)	0.136	(0.343)	0.151	(0.358)	0.289
Family income (1-2 minimum wages)	0.538	(0.499)	0.539	(0.499)	0.941
Family income (>2 minimum wages)	0.320	(0.467)	0.307	(0.461)	0.589
Student works	0.164	(0.370)	0.176	(0.381)	0.352
Perceived high academic ranking	0.424	(0.494)	0.395	(0.489)	0.128
Perceived high self-efficacy	0.350	(0.477)	0.355	(0.479)	0.749
Risk averse	0.857	(0.350)	0.845	(0.362)	0.374
Perceived in likelihood of enrollment	0.841	(0.366)	0.844	(0.363)	0.832
School characteristics					
Number of students (2010-2012)	95.264	(48.292)	92.349	(31.826)	0.718
SABER 11 score (2010-2012)	0.160	(0.216)	0.118	(0.275)	0.381
Morning shift	0.647	(0.478)	0.625	(0.484)	0.811
Afternoon shift	0.330	(0.470)	0.359	(0.480)	0.748
Single shift	0.023	(0.150)	0.016	(0.125)	0.803
School has computer lab	0.969	(0.173)	0.958	(0.201)	0.749
Total number of students	3,224			3,377	
Total number of schools	58			57	

Attrition

	Surveys: Baseline to Follow-Up	Baseline survey to ICFES	Baseline survey to ICFES-SNIES
	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Attrition Rates			
Baseline N	6,601	6,601	6,601
Final N	5,503	6,323	6,303
Attrition Rate	0.166	0.043	0.046
B. Random attrition tests (OLS)			
Treatment	0.015 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.014)

▶ Data

Treatment effects on knowledge and beliefs

Reference earnings by: Reference earnings by:	Vocational		Academic	
	College, degree & field	Public/private college, degree & field	College, degree & field	Public/private college, degree & field
A. ANCOVA				
Treatment	0.009 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.010 (0.038)	-0.010 (0.037)
Adjusted p-value	0.829	0.989	0.884	0.893
Observations	2,782	3,972	2,802	4,009
B. Difference-in-differences				
Treatment × Post	0.033 (0.029)	0.039 (0.028)	0.038 (0.040)	0.049 (0.040)
Adjusted p-value	0.356	0.228	0.444	0.297
Observations	5,691	8,152	5,715	8,196
Baseline mean	0.096	0.217	0.944	1.147

► Main results


Heterogeneous effects on knowledge and beliefs

	Knowledge			Perceived earnings error	
	Labor Observatory	ICETEX	FESBO	Vocational	Academic
A. Academic ranking					
Low	0.000 (0.012)	0.065** (0.022)	0.008 (0.019)	0.042 (0.045)	0.002 (0.039)
High	-0.016 (0.015)	0.016 (0.024)	0.002 (0.021)	0.029 (0.051)	0.077 (0.049)
Low=High	0.986	0.520	1.000	1.000	0.826
B. Self-efficacy					
Low	0.004 (0.011)	0.024 (0.022)	0.015 (0.017)	0.041 (0.044)	0.009 (0.040)
High	-0.025 (0.016)	0.083*** (0.024)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.027 (0.058)	0.076 (0.053)
Low=High	0.697	0.230	0.977	1.000	0.958
C. Risk aversion					
Low	-0.048 (0.028)	0.047 (0.042)	0.085 (0.037)	0.013 (0.102)	-0.072 (0.078)
High	0.004 (0.010)	0.047 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.015)	0.031 (0.041)	0.043 (0.037)
Low=High	0.529	1.000	0.221	1.000	0.858

Heterogeneous effects on test scores and enrollment

	Test scores			Higher education choices				
	Overall score	Math	Language	College enrollment	Academic degree	Private college	Top-10 college	STEM field
A. Academic ranking								
Low	0.015 (0.045)	0.066 (0.049)	-0.010 (0.042)	0.005 (0.025)	0.016 (0.013)	0.005 (0.003)	0.007 (0.009)	0.004 (0.007)
High	-0.002 (0.047)	0.038 (0.050)	0.024 (0.043)	0.007 (0.027)	0.008 (0.018)	0.006 (0.005)	0.011 (0.015)	0.008 (0.011)
Low=High	0.993	0.768	0.692	1.000	0.999	1.000	1.000	1.000
B. Self-efficacy								
Low	-0.034 (0.044)	0.032 (0.049)	-0.052 (0.039)	0.003 (0.023)	0.014 (0.013)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.011)	0.000 (0.008)
High	0.076 (0.048)	0.091 (0.051)	0.094* (0.046)	0.005 (0.027)	0.012 (0.017)	0.008 (0.005)	0.021 (0.012)	0.013 (0.010)
Low=High	0.103	0.423	0.011	1.000	1.000	0.973	0.892	0.871
C. Risk aversion								
Low	0.020 (0.085)	0.081 (0.090)	0.039 (0.074)	0.031 (0.039)	0.019 (0.024)	0.016 (0.009)	0.032 (0.018)	0.032 (0.015)
High	-0.012 (0.040)	0.035 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.022)	0.011 (0.013)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.009)	0.002 (0.007)
Low=High	0.992	0.762	0.668	0.950	1.000	0.720	0.719	0.200

Math score (SABER 11) - QTE



Language score (SABER 11) - QTE

